Expenses:
The Roadblock to Justice
A detailed plan for making litigation affordable

By Maurice Rosenberg, Peter F. Rient, &
Thomas D. Rowe, Jr.

"It has become increasingly apparent
that large numbers of people are practically barred from our courts by the
expense of litigation," warned then
American Bar Association President
Leonard S. Janofsky in the September
1979 issue of the ABA Journal. Chief
Justice John S. Palmore of Kentucky
last year described the problem more
vividly in a speech on "The Urgency of
Economic Litigation":
The average citizen today dreads
the thought of being involved in a
lawsuit. He is afraid of courts and

afraid of lawyers, mostly because the
cost, the time, and the worry are too
great. In California, I am told, if a
case involves no more than $6,000 it
is not worth litigating, because it will
be eaten up by costs. And it all boils
down to a matter of time. Lawyers
are costly because of the time they
must devote to a case. Obviously,
then, if we can cut down the time the
cost will be less.
There is sound evidence that the expense of litigating-for both defendants
and plaintiffs-warps the substantive
law, contorts the face of justice, and, in
some cases, essentially bars the courthouse door. There also is evidence that
the problem is most acute when a
litigant with a worthy cause is not entitled to legal aid, but must face legal expenses out of proportion to the amount
at stake. Cases involving sums in the
range of $1,000 to $25,000 are the
hardest hit. When ordinary damage
cases of that size are litigated to a conclusion, the lawyers' fees on both sides
soon devour a substantial fraction of the
disputed amount. The plaintiffs alternative is to abandon the claim or settle
under pressure, while the defendant can
choose between surrendering or bargaining away a good defense on the merits
because the cost of presenting it is too
great. For both sides, the bright promise
held up by the American justice system
is frequently a chimera.
How to reduce the out-of-scale costs of
litigating middle-size claims is a problem that received considerable attention
from the agenda of the U.S. Justice
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Department's Office for Improvements in the Administration of Justice, but solutions that would assure an
affordable way to pursue or defend middle-size claims
have been elusive. After research, discussion, and
consultation, we have developed a possible framework
for resolving disputes over medium-sized claims at a
reasonable cost that combines simplified procedures
with provisions to shift attorneys' fees appropriately.
This recently formulated approach offers a general
framework that every jurisdiction can employ to meet
its special needs.
While the plan's primary objective is to resolve
disputes over modest sums of money in a fair and costeffective way-relative to the stakes involved-it has
other goals as well. One is to provide a mechanism for
prompt, simplified processing of such claims.
Another is to encourage the parties to come to
reasonable settlements themselves by using procedures that facilitate compromise. The proposal also
seeks to simplify and expedite trials in cases that cannot be settled. Finally, the system tries to promote
substantive justice by providing that the party who
prevails against an unreasonable adversary be awarded attorney's fees, thereby preventing dilution of the
victory.
The Justice Department has not yet considered this
proposal, but, if approved, it could be cast in the form
of a model statute or set of rules which interested state
authorities can adopt on a trial basis. In general, the
system would apply to actions for money damages
from $1,000 to $25,000, and perhaps as high as
$50,000, which would be processed according to the
following three-phase litigation plan:
First, an eligible case would be referred by the court
to a quasi-judicial officer or a panel for expedited
hearing and provisional determination of liability and
damages-a process similar to the arbitration programs now used in some state and federal courts.
A party dissatisfied with the hearing's results could
insist on a judicial determination of the controversy.
These cases would enter phase two and be placed on
an expedited trial calendar. The parties would be required to exchange formal offers of judgment shortly
before the trial date. A special incentive would be provided to encourage reasonable offers and thus improve chances of settlement: if either party made an
offer that was rejected but turned out to be at least as
favorable to the adversary as the result of the trial,
that party would be entitled to postoffer costs and
attorney fees.
In phase three, cases that persist beyond the expedited hearing and settlement procedure would

receive prompt and simple trials, using depositions
and documentary evidence in lieu of live witnesses to
simplify and speed up the formal judicial ruling.
The outline above is only a skeletal framework for a
flexible justice system for medium-sized cases. Many
alternatives are available to flesh out each phase, in
order to make the system adaptable in virtually any
jurisdiction.
* Eligibility. The monetary range of disputes
covered by the proposal should exclude relatively
small and very large claims. The lower limit (set at
$1,000 in our example) should mesh with the upper
limit of the state's small claims courts, because claims
below that limit probably are handled best by the even
simpler procedures in those courts. Fixing the upper
limit is more difficult-experience under existing
court-annexed arbitration shows that the larger the
award, the higher the rate of insistence on trial.'
Therefore, the upper limit must be set with an eye to
keeping down the rate of "appeals" in cases in the upper range; otherwise, instead of achieving economy,
an expedited hearing might result in wasteful duplication. Another risk to consider is that some counsel
may deliberately inflate ad damnum clauses either for
negotiating purposes or to remove the case from the
system. That probably will not occur often, since inclinations toward inflated claims will be discouraged
by the attractive qualities of the program, which
would be available only for smaller claims.
Claims for equitable relief need not necessarily be
excluded from the system if such cases meet the
monetary requirements. Screening mechanisms could
be used to weed out cases realistically seeking
substantial equitable relief, or overly complex cases,
or cases that raise constitutional or other major legal
issues. While the system should apply automatically
to all eligible cases filed after its adoption, it also
could be made available to consenting parties in
larger cases or to litigants in pending cases who found
the special procedures attractive.
* Phase 1-The Expedited Hearing. In several
jurisdictions experience with court annexed arbitration plans that require an expedited hearing before
trial indicates that such hearings can provide speedy
and inexpensive dispute resolution, particularly if
referral comes shortly after filing. 2 Counsel fees tend
to be lower because of the limitations on discovery and
the informality of the hearing, and costs to the system
appear to be substantially less than those for a full
court trial. 3
Shortly after the close of pleadings, the court
should refer each eligible case to a quasi-judicial of-
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ficer or panel of such officials for an expedited, informal hearing and provisional determination. Before
the hearing there would be sufficient time for limited
discovery-through interrogatories with limitations
on their number and length-and for case-dispositive
motions, but the emphasis should be on avoiding procedural obstacles to an early consideration of the
merits.
Each state could name hearing officers with the
background and qualifications best suited to local
needs and could prescribe the number of hearing
officers and their compensation. Senior or retired
judges could be considered, as could quasi-judicial
officials such as magistrates or masters. Qualified
attorneys also might be selected. Provisions should be
adopted to require disqualification, using judicial
disqualification standards, and to monitor the performance of hearing officers.
The proceedings would have to be kept relatively informal so that a party could participate without an attorney (although the parties should be free to appear
at the hearing with counsel or other representatives).
In the interest of informality, any relevant nonprivileged evidence should be admissible, subject to
the hearing officer's power to reject evidence that is
cumulative or of slight probative value.
The tribunal would be required to render a decision
promptly. Its ruling, together with a brief written
statement of findings and supporting reasons, should
be filed with the clerk of the court. Unless either party
insists on trial within a short specified time thereafter,
that ruling should have full force as a final civil judgment and be nonappealable and nonimpeachable except on grounds such as those allowed for attacking
an arbitrator's award-fraud, bias, or other radical
defects. Each side would bear its own expenses, and if
both sides accepted the tribunal's decision, the cost of
the hearing, including the fees of the hearing officers,
would be paid by the state.
A party dissatisfied with the provisional award
would be free to demand a trial. In some states, that
should help the program ward off challenges for impairing constitutional guarantees as to the form of
trial, and in others, it should blunt opposition based
on the unacceptability of precluding or inhibiting a
judicial determination in nonpetty cases. In any event,
the experience with existing court-annexed arbitration
plans is that the rate of insistence on trial is low to
moderate, and the fraction of cases that actually go to
trial is quite small, with many "appealed" cases settled between the request for a court adjudication and
trial. 4

While constitutional or political reasons may make
it necessary to provide recourse to a judicial forum,
we believe it is permissible to create incentives for accepting the result of expedited hearings and mild disincentives for proceeding to trial. Decisions on the
mechanisms for this purpose should depend on the
relative weight of several distinct and sometimes conflicting considerations. One is the importance of the
right to a judicial trial-the more highly it is prized,
the fewer disincentives for insistence on trial there
should be. Since financial disincentives have the
greatest effect on litigants of limited means, we must
avoid disincentives that fall too heavily on less affluent parties.
Equities favoring the party willing to accept an initial ruling also must be seriously considered. Even if a
ruling is not substantially confirmed at trial, making
it a complete dead issue may be too harsh; to view it
merely as a factor influencing the parties' settlement
negotiations would deny the dignity of the earlier proceeding. A party willing to accept a negotiated ruling
could justifiably regard as unfair a system that does
not impose risks on his adversary for rejecting that
ruling. Without a disincentive, the adversary could,
with relative impunity, force that party into further
proceedings, require him to make a settlement offer,
and even threaten him with the prospect of having to
pay costs and attorney's fees from the trial.
Moreover, efficiency and economy make full participation in hearings and acceptance of their outcomes desirable. The soundness of this objective
depends on whether initial hearings produce results
that are tolerably close to those that trials would produce in the same cases. Limited data collected in
California show a tendency for hearing awards to approximate subsequent judicial awards in many cases
and for variances in others to be insubstantial,' suggesting that encouraging parties to abide by initial
rulings is not often likely to defeat substantive justice.
On balance, we think that modest incentives to participate fully in the expedited hearing and to abide by
its results are warranted. First, to encourage parties to
present their best cases at the hearing, the results of
that proceeding could be made admissible at trial. Second, as is commonly provided by court-annexed arbitration plans, the party insisting on trial could be required to pay the court costs of the initial proceeding,
including the fees of the hearing officers; the tender
should be refundable only if the case settles before
trial or if the insisting party improves his position at
trial. This tender requirement could be waived for in(Pleaseturn to page 46)
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digents to avoid placing an undue burden on the right
of poor litigants to trial, but those parties still would
have to reckon with the admissibility of the hearing
outcome and findings when deciding whether to proceed to trial.
Alternatives also might be considered. Depending
on the weight given to the various factors, these could
include: prohibiting reference to the hearing at the
trial, omission of the advance tender requirement,
making the tender nonrefundable whatever the results
of trial, increasing the exposure of the insisting party
by including liability for lawyers' fees generated up to
that point, or making the amount of the tender a
percentage of the provisional award.
0 Phase 2-Pretrial Practice and Offers of Judgment. A case not resolved at the expedited hearing
stage should be returned to the court's calendar for
trial. It either could be placed in the calendar position
it would have occupied if it had not been referred for
expedited hearing or could be given a preference over
nonreferred cases. The latter approach would be more
conducive to speedy disposition, particularly in
jurisdictions with congested calendars and a backlog
of cases ready for trial. In any event, the emphasis
should be on providing a prompt trial. And because
the parties already would have had an opportunity for
some discovery before the expedited hearing and
presumably have presented their best cases at the
hearing, additional pretrial discovery should be permitted only by leave of court on a showing of good
cause.
Shortly before trial (but far enough in advance to
permit subsequent settlement negotiations), both
sides should be required to exchange offers of judgment. There are two considerations that would encourage them to make reasonable offers and thus
enhance the prospects of settlement: they would know
the decision of the impartial hearing tribunal, which
would help them evaluate their cases, and they should
make their offers knowing that the amount they set
may result in either paying or being paid an award of
subsequent costs and attorney's fees, depending on
the relationship between the trial verdict and their offers.
A party whose offer turns out to be reasonable, in
the sense that it was at least as favorable to the adversary as the trial verdict, should be awarded costs and
attorney's fees for the trial; a party whose failure to
accept a reasonable offer resulted in an unnecessary
trial (in the sense that he could have obtained at least
the same result by accepting the offer) should have to
pay costs and attorney's fees to his opponent. In other
cases, if neither offer turned out to be as favorable to
the opponent as the trial outcome, neither party
should be awarded costs or fees.
This aspect of our proposal is based on the "offer of
judgment" provisions of Rule 68, Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, and of parallel state rules. But it goes
beyond those rules by providing that costs could be
shifted in favor of either party instead of solely in the
defendant's favor and by including attorney's fees in
the costs subject to shifting. An amendment to
Federal Rule 68 along these lines is under consideration by the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules. A
similar device exists in England, where the losers
generally pay the winners' counsel fees, but English
practice permits an award of fees to a losing defendant who previously paid into court an amount equal
to or greater than the plaintiff s judgment. Experience
there indicates a fairly high rate of use, a high rate of
settlement, and a low, but still significant, rate of offers not bettered or barely bettered at trial. 6
* Phase 3-Trial. If the case is one that invokes the
right to trial by jury, that right must be preserved in
its essential aspects, as constitutionally required. The
proceedings should be simplified, though, to the maximum extent possible. For example, the jury might
consist of six persons as in most civil jury cases in the
federal courts, voir dire might be simplified, and
peremptory challenges might be sharply limited. The
trial itself could be streamlined by such devices as encouraging use of depositions and documentary
evidence in lieu of new viva voce testimony. In addition, as noted above, the results of the preliminary
hearing and the reasons for the decision should be admissible, subject in a jury trial to appropriate cautionary instructions. The use of testimony given at the
hearing (if recorded) also should be considered; it
might be admissible for impeachment purposes, for
use as substantive evidence, or for use only on stipulation of the parties or in unusual circumstances such as
the death of the witness.
* Award of Costs and Attorney's Fees. In line with
the overall aim of reducing costs, the system should
try to obviate additional, second-round litigation over
whether costs and attorneys' fees should be awarded
and, if so, in what amount. As we visualize the plan,
award of fees should be mandatory if a party fails to
improve on his or her adversary's offer of judgment,
with two exceptions. The first is for cases governed by
an existing fee shifting scheme. For example, if the
legislature has expressed its intention to favor a certain type of action by providing for fee shifting to
prevailing plaintiffs, that policy presumably should
govern. The second exception should permit the court
to deny an award to prevent obvious injustice to a party who failed to improve on his or her opponent's offer
of judgment but who nevertheless was entirely
reasonable in going to trial. For example, in interpreting Federal Rule 68 in Delta Airlines v. August
[101 S. Ct. 1146 (1968)], the Supreme Court held the
rule inapplicable when a plaintiff loses outright, as
opposed to winning a judgment less favorable than the
defendant's offer, thus making cost-shifting not mandatory when the losing plaintiff had rejected a $450
offer of judgment made in response to a nonfrivolous
$20,000 claim. Despite the loss, it would be unfair to
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penalize such a party with additional costs.
In calculating fees, the fact that a prevailing defendant is entitled to recover fees makes it impractical to
rely regularly on an award of a percentage of the verdict as a measure of entitlement. Unfortunately, other
formulas are complex and issue-laden, opening the
possibility of a second proceeding as costly as the trial
itself. Still, it seems desirable to maintain some proportion between the fees awarded and lawyer effort
reasonably expended-a party should not be required
to subsidize a foe's overinvestment in litigation. A
good compromise might be to award a fixed sum per
hour of trial on the theory that the cost of legal
representation subsequent to the offers of judgment is
likely to be connected to the trial's duration.
In conclusion, the system for affordable litigation of
mid-size disputes described here is not a perfected
plan. Its goals are simply to provide a means of adjudicating monetary disputes promptly, fairly, and at
reasonable cost through expedited determinations or
settlements, while carefully preserving the right to
trial for litigants who insist on it. This system combines three elements that have shown promise when
used in isolation: quick, informal hearings under
judicial auspices; incentives for reasonable offers of
judgment; and provisions for shifting the burden of
attorney's fees to a party who after trial is identifiable
as not only the loser but as unreasonable.
This system should be attractive to litigants and
potential litigants who face lawsuits in which victory
would otherwise be Pyrrhic because the costs of the
litigation may be disproportionate to the stakes involved. Given its adaptability to local or special circumstances and needs, the system should also interest

the authorities in a jurisdiction in which the courts
must dispose of large numbers of mid-size cases.
The plan's operational simplicity, plus its promises
of speed, informality, and low cost, will make justice
more accessible than it can be now. These features
should make prospective litigants less likely to turn
away from a search for redress, while the preliminary
determination and settlement incentives should, in
most cases, lead to a resolution without trial. As a
result, parties should be able to resolve their differences at relatively low cost, and the court system
itself would benefit from a reduction in workload and
expense.
The ABA Action Commission to Reduce Court Costs and Delay
agreed at its meeting on May 31-June 1, 1981, to support the program described in this article on an experimental basis and to encourage several selected states to consider its adoption in a form
suitable to local needs and conditions. Inquiries regarding the program and requests for help in implementing it should be addressed
to the Action Commission, 1800 M Street, N.W., Washington,
D.C. 20036.
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